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INTRODUCTION
The timing of the Boston University Law Review symposium, “The Most
Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st Century,” could not have
been better. Occurring, as it did, in the immediate aftermath of the historic
2008 presidential election, the symposium followed an event that
overshadowed the newly-elected Democratic Congress, threatening to push
Congress back to the margins of constitutional commentary and to prevent it
from escaping its status as the most disparaged branch of the federal
government. Our panel’s discussion of whether Congress is capable of
conscientious, responsible constitutional interpretation provides the possibility
of a long overdue rehabilitation of our understanding of congressional
constitutional interpretation. If the panel’s answers can show that Congress is
actually capable of such constitutional interpretation then we will have gone a
long way toward ameliorating, or perhaps undoing, the propensity of scholars
and others to disparage Congress as a constitutional actor unworthy of respect
or parity with the other branches of the federal government.
This Essay suggests that while the purpose of our panel is laudable, it is
ultimately misguided. First, I suggest that we are being asked the wrong
question. The proper question is not whether Congress is capable of
conscientious, responsible constitutional interpretation but rather how the
institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution compares with
that of the other two federal branches. Second, I suggest that a debate that took
place more than two decades ago on this question provides a useful starting
point for contemporary analysis of the comparative institutional capacity of
Congress to interpret the Constitution. Third, I suggest the research necessary
to construct a sound, positive account of Congress’s relative capacity to
interpret the Constitution. While these first three points are descriptive, I
∗

Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law & Director of the UNC
Center on Law and Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law School.
B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago.

525

526

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:525

conclude with a brief normative standard for evaluating the quality of
congressional constitutional interpretation. My positive account of Congress’s
capacity for constitutional interpretation has normative consequences; it rules
out certain ideals and possibilities. With these consequences in mind, I
suggest the same standard as the one James Bradley Thayer proposed more
than a century ago: reasonableness.1 We simply should ask what would be
reasonable to expect from Congress in the field of constitutional interpretation.
My tentative answer, which might sound to some people worse than intended,
is that it should not be the same outcome as what we would expect from either
the President or the federal judiciary. Congress is a different institution and, of
course, a legislative one at that. Thus, we cannot expect Congress to function
in the same manner as the other federal branches. We need to formulate
reasonable expectations for a legislative body as large and as constitutionally
and historically constructed as Congress.
Thus the most important
consideration is not whether, according to some abstract analysis or standard,
Congress is a conscientious, responsible interpreter of the Constitution. What
should matter is not trying to make Congress into something it is not nor can
ever be, but rather improving our understanding of how Congress actually
performs its constitutional functions and how to improve that functioning.
I.

THE RIGHT QUESTION

The launching pad for our discussion – and for the question of whether
Congress is a conscientious interpreter of the Constitution – is James Bradley
Thayer’s seminal 1893 article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law.2 In that article, Thayer makes two important claims
about congressional constitutional interpretation. First, he maintains that,
among the three branches of the federal government, Congress is the principal
interpreter of the Constitution.3 Second, Thayer claims that Congress has the
institutional capacity to engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation.4
But, as I believe Thayer recognized, these claims are not necessarily connected
or interdependent. It is possible for a public actor to have principal authority to
interpret the Constitution but still be prone to mistakes or to doing a less than
perfect job of it. It is also possible for a public actor to have some authority,
but not the principal authority, to interpret the Constitution but nevertheless
have the institutional capacity to do a perfectly good, or quite respectable, job
of it.
The fact that I do not find Thayer’s two basic claims to be interdependent
1

James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 148 (1893).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 136 (“[I]t is the legislature to whom this power is given, – this power, not merely
of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the constitution which shall deeply
affect the whole country . . . .”).
4 Id.
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(or for one to follow logically or inexorably from the other) leads me to think
that we ought to be answering a different question of principal concern in
Thayer’s article: the question of Congress’s relative capacity to interpret the
Constitution. The principal matter of concern to Thayer – and particularly to
me – is not whether Congress is capable of conscientious constitutional
interpretation. That is a normative question, and I am agnostic at least for
present purposes on the appropriate standard for measuring the quality of
Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution. The critical question is a
descriptive one – namely, how does Congress’s capacity to interpret the
Constitution compare to that of either the presidency or the federal courts,
including the Supreme Court. Thayer’s answer was that Congress did no
worse a job than that of the Court.5 Hence, he suggested, based on this
descriptive account and the fact that members of Congress, unlike federal
judges, are politically accountable, the normative proposition that the Court
should defer to any congressional constitutional interpretations that were
reasonable.6
In other works, I have suggested that the Supreme Court is not necessarily
supreme within the whole domain of constitutional interpretation and that
Congress has at least as important a role in interpreting the Constitution.7 In
the next two Parts of this Essay, I suggest that while there is good reason to
believe Thayer correctly claimed that Congress has the institutional capacity to
undertake conscientious constitutional interpretation, we remain relatively
ignorant about the relative ability, or quality, of congressional constitutional
interpretation.
II.

THE DEBATE: A QUARTER-CENTURY LATER

While Thayer was among the first scholars to seriously consider Congress’s
comparative ability to interpret the Constitution, he has not been the last. In
fact, the timing of this symposium on Congress as the most disparaged branch
coincides with the twenty-fifth anniversary of a debate waged in the pages of
the North Carolina Law Review over the question of Congress’s institutional
capacity to interpret the Constitution. On one side of the debate was Judge
Abner Mikva, who harshly criticized Congress’s institutional capacity for
conscientious constitutional interpretation.8 Mikva’s critique surprised many

5

Id. at 148 (describing the judicial function as “merely that of fixing the outside border
of reasonable legislative action,” thereby complementing Congress’s role as the primary
constitutional interpreter).
6 Id. at 144 (pointing to the judicial standard of review in upholding rational
congressional actions).
7 Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 715 (2008)
[hereinafter Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent] (arguing that precedents created by nonjudicial actors are often stronger than those produced by courts).
8 Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REV. 587, 590 (1983).
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people because he had been a well-respected member of the House of
Representatives before his appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Nevertheless, Mikva, citing three examples of
constitutional deliberation, argued that constitutional interpretation by
members of Congress was suspect, and often poor, because Congress was not
structured to allow for conscientious constitutional interpretation, and because
most members of Congress were not lawyers, did not have the time or interest
to delve deeply into the constitutional questions before them, and were forced,
for one reason or another, to rely on their staffs (or other congressional
members) for assistance in constitutional interpretation.9
Two years later, Lou Fisher, a well-respected separation-of-powers
specialist with the Congressional Research Service, published a response to
Mikva.10 Fisher argued that congressional constitutional interpretation was not
only better than Mikva had suggested, but in fact was relatively good because
members of Congress often seriously engaged with constitutional issues and
received excellent institutional support on constitutional matters from their
professional staffs (including many lawyers) as well as from the Congressional
Research Service, committee staffs, expert witnesses, and the Offices of the
Legislative Counsel of both the House and the Senate.11
Interestingly, legal scholars have paid scant attention to the Mikva-Fisher
debate. In the twenty-five subsequent years, academic commentaries on
congressional constitutional interpretation have rarely referenced the debate,
much less discussed it at any length. This is a shame since the subject of
congressional constitutional interpretation has hardly gone away in the
intervening years. Indeed, congressional constitutional interpretation has only
grown in importance, and Mikva’s and Fisher’s arguments still resonate with
both critics and defenders of Congress’s institutional capacity to interpret the
Constitution. Perhaps what is less appreciated is that their debate reflects the
ongoing problems with commentaries on congressional constitutional
interpretation, problems that we need to overcome if we are to better
understand the relative capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution. It
turns out that the arguments made by both Mikva and Fisher are still
illuminating but are not without problems.
For instance, Mikva’s comments were based on anecdotal, not empirical,
evidence.12 His three examples can raise, but not settle, questions about

9 Id. at 609 (“Both institutionally and politically, Congress is designed to pass over the
constitutional questions, leaving the hard decisions to the courts.”).
10 Lou Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV.
707 (1985).
11 Id. at 727-31.
12 See Mikva, supra note 8, at 590 (describing three examples of congressional
deliberation on constitutional matters including Congress’s consideration of the Fair Labor
Standards Amendment of 1974, the Senate’s deliberation of a legislative veto provision to
the Administrative Procedure Act, and congressional discussion of appellate review in the
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Congress’s institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution. Moreover,
Mikva might not have been a completely dispassionate analyst. As a sitting
judge at the time he wrote his commentary, Mikva conceivably had a vested
interest in reaching the conclusion he did – namely, that federal judges (like
himself) should not defer to interpretations of the Constitution by Congress but
instead should reach independent interpretations of the pertinent constitutional
issues. Mikva was a distinguished public servant, excellent judge, and brilliant
lawyer, but his critique of Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution is
prone to being dismissed as too self-interested.
There are arguably similar problems with Fisher’s response.13 First, the fact
that there are resources available to assist members of Congress with
constitutional interpretation does not tell us anything about the relative quality
of those resources or the interpretations based on their use. It is possible that
these resources are not as good as Fisher suggests. Moreover, we have little or
no idea of how often members (as opposed to their staffs) actually avail
themselves of these resources, and we particularly lack an understanding of
their impact on congressional constitutional interpretation. Second, Fisher’s
analysis, like that of Mikva’s, might be too self-interested to warrant
confidence. After all, Fisher was defending the very institution of which he
was – and remains – a vital part. Third, Fisher’s analysis could have benefitted
from more empirical analysis. Indeed, one important question raised by the
Mikva-Fisher debate is what kind of data would help us to better understand
and to evaluate the institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the
Constitution.14 Merely describing the resources available to assist with
congressional constitutional interpretation does not tell us much about either
how such interpretation compares with that of the other branches or why courts
should defer to it.
The former of these two questions is the descriptive question of principal
concern to me in this Essay. It requires a sounder, positive account of the
relative institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution. Such
an account requires more information than we have at present on congressional
constitutional interpretation. Thus, in the next Part I consider the other
information necessary to better understand and evaluate the relative
institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution.
III. WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
While legal scholars over the past twenty-five years have not done as much
as they could to update the Mikva-Fisher debate, they have not been
completely unproductive, and we have learned a few things about Congress’s
capacity to interpret the Constitution. In this Part, I briefly consider the state
1970 Organized Crime Control Act).
13 I hasten to add that Lou Fisher is a friend of mine and a first-rate constitutional
analyst.
14 See Fisher, supra note 10, at 708; Mikva, supra note 8, at 590.
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of our knowledge – and particularly what more we need to know – of the
institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution.
The first thing to acknowledge is that since the publication of Lou Fisher’s
1985 response to Judge Mikva the world of constitutional law and Congress’s
role within it have not remained static. Indeed, the past twenty-five years have
featured as much constitutional activity in Congress as there has been during
any other comparable period of time. I need not provide a comprehensive
recounting of all those activities here, but even a small sampling reveals the
breadth and depth of congressional constitutional activity: the impeachment
and removals of three federal district judges in the late 1980s;15 the contentious
Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Robert Bork in 198716 and Clarence
Thomas in 1991;17 the appointment of Chief Justices of the United States in
198618 and again in 2005;19 congressional decision-making during the 1990s
regarding unfunded mandates, major health care and welfare reform, and the
impeachment and trial of President William Jefferson Clinton;20 Congress’s
responses to the President’s increasing use of signing statements;21 and
Congress’s response to the worst down-turn in the economy since the Great
Depression.22 Moreover, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the
United States provoked numerous responses from Congress, including, inter
alia, the following: debating and issuing a joint resolution supporting the
President’s use of military force in both Afghanistan and Iraq;23 the funding of
military invasions of (and operations within) those two countries;24 enactment
of the PATRIOT Act;25 legislation restricting habeas corpus and otherwise
governing the conditions and interrogations of people captured and held in
detention as a result of the terrorist attacks;26 and the strident debates within
15

See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
40 (2d ed. 2000).
16 See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1987).
17 See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1991).
18 Editorial, The Hearings on Justice Rehnquist, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1986, at 14.
19 Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Hearing Reveals Divisions, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 14, 2005, at 7.
20 See GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 177-94.
21
Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
22
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
23
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
24
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 6, 121 Stat. 1844,
2446-56 (2007).
25 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
26
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2006 (2006)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.),
invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 37,
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the Senate over the constitutionality of the filibuster from 2003 to 2005.27 This
litany of examples ought to be a dramatic reminder of the extent to which
Congress renders constitutional judgments.28
While this extensive activity does not tell us much, if anything, about the
relative quality of congressional constitutional interpretation, its enormous
variety is itself significant. The sheer extent of the constitutional judgments
that are made in Congress in enacting legislation – far more extensive in a
given year compared to the Supreme Court in deciding cases – suggests that
Congress does have the institutional capacity to make these judgments.29
Moreover, these activities provide legal scholars and others with ample
opportunities to study the institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the
Constitution. Somehow Congress manages to produce such judgments. These
activities are, in other words, the very things we need to study if we are
interested in refining our understanding of the institutional capacity of
Congress to interpret the Constitution.
A second thing we probably understand better today than we might have
twenty-five years ago is the ramifications of viewing Congress as either an “it”
or a “they.” Just as the Court should be considered a “they” and not an “it,”30
we may consider Congress to be a “they” and not an “it.” If we think of
Congress as a group of people – 425 in the House of Representatives and 100
in the Senate – then the complexity of what Congress is and what Congress
does becomes more apparent. From such a perspective, congressional
decisions, even those involving constitutional interpretations, could not be
sensibly likened to those of a single, rational individual. Group decisionmaking is likely to produce outcomes that are hard to reconcile and may reflect
compromises among people whose preferences are bound to vary in terms of
intensity and priority.31 Moreover, thinking of Congress as a “they” would
attach more significance to the process through which decisions are reached
and thus is likely to emphasize the importance of the acts of particular
27

David D. Kirkpatrick, Deal Draws Criticism from Left and Right, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2005, at A18.
28 For a discussion of these and other examples of non-judicial precedents, see Gerhardt,
Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 7, at 738-40, 745-53 (cataloging the various ways that
institutions create precedents).
29
See id. at 736-45 (chronicling the various ways Congress makes constitutional
decisions); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 985-87 (2005) [hereinafter Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency]
(explaining how scholars should understand a more nuanced and moderate view of
precedent in constitutional law).
30 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory
and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 549, 550 (2005) (arguing that analytical
problems arise by viewing the judiciary as a single entity rather than a collective body).
31 See Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency, supra note 29, at 955-57 (using rational
choice theory to explain how Presidents’ efforts to influence Court decision-making are
rarely effective).
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individuals – for example, committee chairs who wield inordinate influence in
scheduling committee hearings and votes, or members who might exhibit
either relative ignorance of various issues being discussed or a relative lack of
engagement, preparation, or attendance.
But shifting the perspective, as per Mark Tushnet’s suggestion on the day
our panel met, to viewing Congress as an “it” can be equally if not more
useful.32 To begin with, the quality of any particular individual’s performance
becomes irrelevant. If we understand the House and Senate each as
institutions, rather than as groups of people, then it does not matter whether
some, most, or all members are unprepared or ignorant in the context of
constitutional analysis. Instead, what matters is what it does as well as what
are its rules, standard procedures, formal resources, and outputs. If we know
these rules and other features of Congress, we can develop an understanding of
how the institution operates. Indeed, viewing Congress as an “it” helps
illuminate the prerequisites that must be met in order for certain actions to take
place. What particular individuals do matters less than the nature of the rules
and procedures for decision-making and whether, or to what extent, they have
been followed. Both the reasons for the rules and the consequences of
complying with them are what count. Thus, if we think of Congress as an “it”
and not a “they,” one does not have to worry about whether Senator Arlen
Specter voted for a particular bill because he thought the courts might strike it
down,33 or whether Senator Ted Stevens did not base his votes to remove three
judges in the 1980s on his own study of the pertinent records but rather on his
preference simply to follow the leads of several other senators whose views he
respected or chose to emulate.34
The utility and pertinence of the information that we gather to analyze
congressional constitutional interpretation depends largely on the perspective
of the analyst. For instance, assume a scholar argues that Congress’s capacity
to interpret the Constitution is not what it used to be and bases his assertion on
the fact that more members of Congress in the past did their own work (and
wrote their own speeches) than do today. This assumption might well be valid,
but it is of limited relevance. True, it tells us something about the relative
quality of certain individual performances within the Congress, but given that
32 Viewing Congress as an “it” for the purpose of constitutional analysis helps explain
why congressional actions in the aggregate demonstrate actions seemingly lacking in
consideration of the Constitution’s restraints. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG
RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 118 (2008).
33 See Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the
Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 499 (2009).
34 This reference to Senator Stevens is based on a survey I conducted as a special
consultant for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal. Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Senate’s Process for Removing Federal Judges, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 139 (1993) (summarizing
the results of a comprehensive questionnaire completed by twenty-one senators).
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the workload of members of Congress has exponentially increased over the last
160 years, none of us should be surprised to find that at least some, if not most,
members of Congress rely on their staffs and other resources more than they
used to. Indeed, the increased workload helps to explain why these resources
exist. From the institutional perspective (i.e., the perspective of Congress as an
“it”), we are no longer interested in individual performance or motivation but
rather the basic patterns of what Congress does (and does not do) over time.
This includes but is not limited to the levels of participation in committee and
floor debates, the numbers of speeches addressing or making constitutional
points, the responsibilities of committee and other staffs in the House and the
Senate, the productivity of committees including its outputs, and the number of
laws – and other matters – on which each chamber of Congress acts as a whole
during a given session. These patterns are objective data on congressional
constitutional activity.
The persistent disparagement of Congress derives in part from not just how
analysts perceive Congress but also how they perceive the other branches of
the federal government. It is possible that some people look down on
Congress because they are looking at it from the perspective of another branch,
which might well be inclined, for its own self-serving reasons, to look down on
the other branches. It is also possible that opinions of the institutional
capacities of the different branches might depend not just on analysts’
experiences (i.e., for whom they have worked), but also their ambitions (i.e.,
whose favor they would like to curry or for which branch they would like to
work). Understanding Congress requires, in other words, appreciating the
nature and ramifications of our own biases, preferences, and experiences.
A third thing we know we need to do in order to fully appreciate Congress’s
institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution is not to overstate the
significance of the phenomenon that Professor Tushnet describes as “judicial
overhang.”35 It is important to appreciate that relatively little of the realm of
constitutional activity in Congress is actually subjected to judicial review, and
the relatively little that is subjected to judicial review is usually upheld.36
Among the more notable congressional decisions that have usually not been
subject to judicial review are oversight, funding, impeachments, removals and
convictions, expulsions, rule-making within the House and the Senate, treaty
ratifications, and nominations.37 Judicial overhang is not, nor ever has been,
pertinent to any of these areas of political and constitutional decision-making.
Nor do I expect it to be.
But, there is more. The political salience of different subjects is likely to

35

See Tushnet, supra note 33, at 504 (describing the idea that Congress will engage in
scant constitutional interpretation because of the belief that the courts are in place to correct
any errors).
36 See Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 7, at 745-52 (arguing that there are
various mechanisms at work that limit the scope of constitutional review in the courts).
37 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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make a difference in congressional performance, though the precise difference
is not so clear. On the one hand, the prospect of extensive public scrutiny is
likely to focus the attention of members of Congress. Members of Congress
are likely to pay more attention to highly politically salient matters, such as
presidential impeachments. It is reasonable to assume that members of
Congress will work hard on matters on which they believe the public is
watching. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that members of
Congress will pay less attention to matters they believe will make little or no
difference to their re-elections. Such was the case, for instance, in several
Senate impeachment trials of the 1930s, in which attendance was extremely
poor because senators did not think the trials were pertinent to their reelections.38 Consequently, the Senate amended its standing rules to create a
special impeachment trial committee consisting of twelve senators who would
be responsible for gathering evidence, taking testimony, and writing a report
for their colleagues.39 The Senate invoked this rule in each of the three
removal trials it was obliged to hold during the 1980s, but it chose not to
invoke the rule in President Clinton’s trial because senators perceived that their
constituents wanted them to personally participate in a trial with the potential
to oust a President of the United States.40
On the other hand, the fact that an issue lacks political salience does not
necessarily mean that members of Congress will simply check out or ignore it
altogether. There are some issues – trademarks and copyrights for instance –
on which some members of Congress might have special expertise to which
their colleagues might defer. Moreover, the absence of a spotlight might
actually lead some members of Congress to pay more attention to the actual
merits of an issue and less attention to the political ramifications. Indeed,
some issues might not be politically salient to a wide constituency but rather to
particular segments or sections of the country. For instance, the subject of
alternative fuels might not be of interest to voters in some parts of the country
but it might be a serious concern to voters in other parts of the country.41 The
point is that judicial overhang might simply be one of many factors that might
enter into the calculus of members of Congress and sometimes it might be
overshadowed or displaced by other factors. Hence, it is important to verify
how much and in what specific ways judicial overhang affects the capacity of
Congress to interpret the Constitution. The suggestion that judicial overhang
might be a disincentive for some members of Congress to become more

38 See GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 37-39 (discussing Senators’ “general lack of interest”
in impeachment proceedings and citing as an example the 1933 impeachment trial of Judge
Louderback where only three senators were present).
39 COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN
THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS, S. DOC. NO. 110-6, at 210 (2007).
40 GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 180-85.
41 For example, voters in Iowa may be particularly interested in legislation related to
fuels developed from corn.
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engaged is not a fact but an assumption that sorely needs testing.
Moreover, it is an unproven assumption that members of Congress will
naturally or necessarily defer to courts on questions of constitutional law. It is
possible that members of Congress will defer when they agree with (or are
indifferent to) what the courts rule. But, there is a long history of members of
Congress vigorously defending their entitlement to have an independent say
about what the Constitution means. Indeed, it is not hard to find examples of
Congress deciding to take certain actions – such as enacting legislative vetoes42
and criminalizing flag burning43 or partial-birth abortions44 – that appear to be
flatly inconsistent with judicial rulings. Such examples ought to lead us to
examine more systematically how often Congress acts contrary to the Court
and does not just side-step or act with apparent indifference to the prospect of
judicial review.
IV. EVALUATING CONGRESS
In this final Part, I briefly consider the normative question of how to
evaluate congressional constitutional interpretation. The short answer is that it
depends on whether one views Congress as a “they” or an “it.” If, for instance,
we think of Congress as a “they,” then we could ask six questions. First, we
could ask about the relative quality of the constitutional decision-making of the
members of Congress. To answer this question, we need to consider the skills
required to do good or excellent work in Congress. Presumably, these include,
inter alia, drafting statutes, speech-writing, building coalitions to forge
legislative majorities, delivering goods and services to their constituents or
states, hiring good staff, and knowledge of, or expertise in, constitutional law
and the rules, procedures, and history of Congress. For each of these skills, we
can develop standards and then assess how well each member of Congress
measures up to these standards.
Second, we could ask how well members of Congress fulfill their duties as
representatives. Generally, these duties may be acting as agents to implement
the wishes of their constituents, to reflect the diverse interests of their districts
or states, and to act in the best interests of their constituents. One could then
assess how well each representative or senator performs one, or all, of these
functions.
Third, we could follow David Mayhew’s lead in evaluating the leadership of
members of Congress in affecting the public sphere.45 Like Mayhew did, we
42 See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal – Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115 (1996) (demonstrating that legislative
vetoes remain a widely adopted legislative tool despite contrary Supreme Court decisions).
43 See Eichman v. United States, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (striking down a federal flag
desecration statute nearly identical to a state statute previously struck down by the Court).
44 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) (upholding the federal partialbirth abortion ban nearly identical to a state statute struck down by the Court).
45 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS 1-6 (2000) (chronicling the
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could examine how often each member of Congress has attempted to take
affirmative leadership in Congress, and whether it has been to propose or push
legislation or to advance or support some other congressional initiative.46
Once we calculated these numbers, then we could ask how many times the
House or Senate followed the member’s lead. This would give us some idea of
a particular member’s relative effectiveness as a leader in Congress.
Fourth, we could ask about the role of congressional stare decisis. In
particular, we could ask to what extent members of Congress follow prior
congressional constitutional interpretations and/or their own prior
constitutional decisions. This question is directed at uncovering data on the
fidelity of each member of Congress to prior constitutional decisions. It is also
directed at assessing the path dependency of such decisions, i.e., the extent to
which they constrain a member’s subsequent decision-making.47 Similarly, we
could ask about the extent to which members followed judicial precedent.
Fifth, we could assess how well each member of Congress employs the
different modes of constitutional analysis. This would require gathering all the
public statements of members of Congress and analyzing the quality of
constitutional analysis in each. This might also entail asking whether a
member got a particular constitutional question right.
Last but not least, we could ask what kinds of support or assistance
members of Congress need to improve their constitutional interpretation. Of
course, the answer depends in part on the relative quality of the resources
currently available to assist constitutional interpretation and of the
constitutional interpretation itself. It also depends on the criteria we use to
evaluate the quality of these two things.
If, however, we viewed Congress as an “it,” we would ask some of the same
as well as some different questions. The first is what would be a reasonable
expectation to have about Congress as a legislative body. It is not reasonable
to expect Congress, at least at the institutional level, to act like either the
judicial or executive branches. But the question remains what should we
expect from Congress as an institution charged with various constitutional
authorities and responsibilities? One possibility is to examine how one
Congress measures against another Congress, while another possibility is to
develop, as I suggested above, a positive account of how Congress actually
makes constitutional decisions. In developing this account, we should
contributions of various important congressional members throughout history and
introducing a means for examining public opinions as affected by individual congressional
member action).
46 Id. at 168-75 (introducing an analysis of “action patterns” in the careers of members of
Congress and noting that relatively few individual congressional members have careers
involving spearheading multiple major congressional actions).
47 On the limited path dependency of judicial and non-judicial precedents, see Gerhardt,
Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 7, at 784 (“Shifting perspective from judicial to nonjudicial precedent illuminates that the Court is supreme within a much narrower realm than
that in which non-judicial precedents are made.”).
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distinguish between the interpretation of the Constitution (i.e., the role of the
judiciary in answering questions about constitutional meaning) and
constitutional construction (i.e., the culmination, or consequences, of
congressional efforts to implement constitutional ideals or values). The quest
to illuminate Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution neglects to take
into account the fact that the notion of constitutional construction better
captures the essence of what Congress is doing when it is addressing or
confronting questions of constitutional meaning.
While constitutional
construction is infused with politics, this does not mean that it is irrelevant to
the development of constitutional practices and understanding over time. As
Keith Whittington suggests:
Political practice helps define what we understand the Constitution to
mean, but it does not arise through anything like interpretive argument
and does not exist in the form of constitutional law. The idea of
construction helps us understand how constitutional meaning is
elaborated even when government officials do not seem to be talking
about the Constitution, or are not saying anything at all.48
He explains further that the “defining features of constitutional constructions
are that they resolve textual indeterminacies and that they address
constitutional subject matter. Thus, some political debates are properly
characterized as constitutional even if explicit references to the terms of a
specific written constitution are rare or nonexistent.”49 The point is that the
constitutionally-significant activity in Congress looks and sounds different
than it does in the courts. We should not only factor these differences into our
understanding and appraisal of Congress but also recognize that constitutional
construction itself needs to be the focus of our inquiry.
Next, we could ask about the extent to which Congress acts in accordance
with, or independent from, the Supreme Court. This is a question not just
about whether Congress demonstrates fidelity to Supreme Court decisions but
also whether, or to what extent, constitutional history matters to Congress.
This requires in turn that we examine the extent to which Congress produces or
follows constitutional history (and what it considers, or takes into account, as
such). Moreover, we could ask whether Congress has developed the capacity
to follow constitutional law. Of course, this question requires that we clarify
what we mean by constitutional law. It is commonplace to equate
constitutional law with the decisions of the Supreme Court, but one thing to
consider is what Congress treats as constitutional law.
Finally, we could ask the same question for Congress as an “it” as we do for
the members of Congress as a “they” – did Congress get it right? In some
ways, this is both the easiest and hardest question. It is the easiest because
asking it does not require any knowledge of Congress. It is also easy because

48
49

KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 7 (1999).
Id. at 9.
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an analyst might presumably use whatever he or she thinks is the proper test
for determining the right outcomes of constitutional questions. Yet, the history
of constitutional theory teaches us nothing if it fails to teach us that every
theory of constitutional law is imperfect. The question is either which is the
least imperfect or which of the imperfect theories of constitutional law should
be used and why. Luckily for me, I need not answer that question because it is
well beyond the scope of this symposium.
CONCLUSION
The question of the relative institutional capacity of Congress to interpret
the Constitution turns on many factors. It depends on, inter alia, whether we
conceive of Congress as either a “they” or an “it,” as having the same or
different capacity for constitutional interpretation than the other branches, as
performing particular functions of representation, as making the correct
constitutional decisions, as engaging with the different modes of constitutional
argumentation, as developing or utilizing the appropriate resources to assist
with conscientious constitutional argumentation, as being faithful to or
independent from the Court, and as acting consistently with its rules,
procedures, traditions, and prior constitutional decision-making.
What we learn about Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution from
the answers to these inquiries has tremendous ramifications for constitutional
law. It is important for raising (or perhaps maintaining lowered) respect for
Congress as one of the three principal constitutional actors at the federal level.
It is important to the perennially important question of how much deference
does, or should, the courts give to congressional constitutional interpretation.
Thayer’s answer was that the federal courts should defer to Congress a great
deal.50 But his answer depended on a presumption, and not the fact that
Congress is at least as good as the courts in interpreting the Constitution.51
Moreover, Thayer’s answer did not depend on whether such deference was
either compelled by, or consistent with, the Constitution itself. The question of
whether the Court should defer to congressional constitutional interpretation
further depends on the Supreme Court’s own responsibilities and capacity to
interpret the Constitution, neither of which are concerns of this symposium.
Thus, the question of whether the Court should defer to congressional
constitutional interpretation is not a question we can answer, since it depends
on information we do not have and on matters beyond the scope of our
immediate project. Our immediate project is to compare the capacity of
Congress to that of the other branches to interpret the Constitution. This is, as
I have said, an old question, but it says a lot more about the legal academy than
Congress that it is a question that legal scholars have not yet answered.

50

See Thayer, supra note 1, at 144.
For a modern defense of this view, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF
REASON 57-62 (2008).
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